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1. INTRODUCTION
Politics has been recognized by economists as an crucial element of trade policy making. How
it interacts with the economics of trade policy and to what extent it matters, however, remain
an open question and continue to be investigated by theoretical and empirical research. Among
them, the paper by Grossman and Helpman (1994) (henceforth G-H) emerged as a popular theory.
In G-H, tariff formation is modeled as the outcome of a menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston,
1986). In an economy of perfectly competitive sectors, sectoral interest groups bid for favorable
trade policy by implicitly promising campaign contributions which are a function of potential trade
policies; the government in turn optimizes by choosing the trade policy that maximizes the sum of its
campaign contribution receipts and weighted aggregate welfare. The G-H model was later extended
by Chang (2005) to the setting of monopolistically competitive sectors, which arguably represent a
significant portion of industrial production and international trade (Helpman, 1999). Chang (2005)
shows that the endogenous protection structure for monopolistically competitive sectors differs
systematically from that for perfectly competitive sectors. First of all, the benchmark welfare-
maximizing import tariff is strictly positive, which is in contrast with the free trade prediction under
perfect competition. Second, as in G-H, lobbying efforts of competing interest groups jointly raise
import protection levels in organized sectors (represented by a lobby) and lower them in unorganized
sectors (not represented by a lobby) from the benchmark welfare-maximizing levels. However, the
endogenous tariff level in unorganized sectors will not fall below zero. This is contrary to G-H where
unorganized sectors will be penalized by negative protection. Third, the level of import protection
varies inversely with the degree of import penetration, regardless of whether or not the sector is
organized. In other words, sectors with higher import penetration will receive lower protection.
This negative relationship applies only to organized sectors in G-H; in unorganized sectors, higher
import penetration leads to higher protection (or more precisely, less negative protection).
The last theoretical prediction is of most interest to empirical researchers. The general per-
ception before the G-H model was that a sector badly injured by imports would tend to receive
higher protection. This perception was supported by most of the empirical work conducted before
G-H; however, their findings were often derived from ad hoc regression models without theoreti-
cal underpinnings. The G-H model challenged this conventional view, as it predicts the opposite
for organized sectors. Several authors (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay,
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2000; Eicher and Osang, 2002) have hence estimated the G-H model and tested this prediction.
In general, their findings support the G-H model. The results of Chang (2005) offer a picture
completely at odd with the conventional view, as the import protection level actually falls with
import penetration, regardless of whether or not the sector is organized. This difference in find-
ings between G-H and Chang (2005) suggests that the prediction of the G-H-type model in this
regard will depend on the nature of market structure. Hence, a correctly-specified empirical model
relating to the G-H-type model should allow for heterogeneous responses of protection to import
penetration across sectors of different market structures. This has not been considered by previous
cross-sectional G-H-type empirical studies.
Difference in market structure not only implies difference in the signs of protection response
to import penetration, the absolute magnitude of response also differs. In G-H, the magnitude of
response in organized and unorganized sectors can be expressed as two functions of the two political
parameters – the government’s weight on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions,
and the economy’s degree of political representation in the trade policy area. As a result, the two
political parameters can be identified. In the model of Chang (2005), the responses can be similarly
expressed as two functions of the two political parameters. However, the functional forms differ
from those in G-H and hence in general will imply different estimates of the political parameters.
Thus, if the market structure for a sector is misspecified, the overall estimation of the political
parameters is likely to be biased.
To account for the heterogeneity in protection structure across different market structures and
the effect of this heterogeneity on the estimation of the political parameters, this paper proposes a
general empirical specification that accommodates both perfectly and monopolistically competitive
sectors. We base the empirical framework on G-H for perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang
(2005) for monopolistically competitive sectors. In order to implement this heterogeneous market
structure specification, however, we need to classify sectors into perfectly or monopolistically com-
petitive sectors. We construct a market structure indicator variable to assign sectors into one of
the two subsets. The import protection equations for the two subsets of sectors are then jointly
estimated. Recall from the previous paragraph that the four responses of protection to import
penetration – two for each market structure – are functions of the two political parameters and yet
the political parameters are shared by all sectors in the same economy. Thus, the two protection
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equations cannot be estimated separately; in fact, the response coefficients in the heterogeneous
specification are explicitly related by two linear constraints.
We construct the market structure dummy based on the condition that firms in a monopolisti-
cally competitive sector necessarily face a demand elasticity larger than one, and the criterion that
the degree of seller competition in a monopolistically competitive sector be lower than a specified
threshold. We allow the threshold to vary across a wide range of observed values and estimate the
heterogeneous model conditional on each resulting classification of sectors. We then search for the
optimal specification of the market structure dummy that gives rise to the maximum likelihood for
the heterogeneous model. The use of extraneous economic variables on a priori grounds to classify
observations into different regimes follows from Fair and Jaffee (1972) in the literature of switching
regressions. We generalize their approach by not requiring knowledge of the threshold value and
let the data determine endogenously the optimal separation of the sample. This requires at most
n searches (where n is the sample size), as compared to 2n searches (which is intractable) if no
economic constraint is imposed on the construction of the market structure dummy.1
The heterogeneous model with the optimal classification of sectors is then compared to the ho-
mogeneous G-H model with perfect competition which is often adopted by previous cross-sectional
G-H-type empirical studies. Each model is taken in turn as the null hypothesis and tested against
the alternative model according to the non-nested J-test of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). The
heterogeneous model can be regarded as a joint hypothesis that the market structure dummy is
correctly specified and that the model of Chang (2005) is correctly specified for the subset of mo-
nopolistically competitive sectors. The homogeneous perfect competition model, on the other hand,
hypothesizes that the G-H model is correctly specified for all sectors. If a model as the null is re-
jected by the J-test, the data suggest that the alternative model provides some extra explanatory
power (in a statistically significant way) over and above what the null specification does. On the
other hand, if a model as the null is accepted, the test suggests that the alternative model does
not significantly improve the statistical goodness-of-fit of the null. Both models can be rejected
as the null hypothesis. In this case, the test suggests that neither model is complete; important
1Alternatively, one may contemplate the use of random switching regression models as developed by Quandt
(1972), Kiefer (1978), Quandt and Ramsey (1978), Hartley (1978), and Phillips (1991) among others. However, as
commented in Quandt (1972), applying random switching regression models does not allow individual observations
to be identified with particular regimes but computes only the probability that one or the other regime was operative
during the sample period. This does not seem particularly appealing to us, as we do not consider market structure
to be a random event.
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variables or structures are missing from the models. If both models are accepted, the test cannot
differentiate between the two models. If one model is accepted, while the other is rejected, the test
suggests that the first model provides a statistically-significant better fit to the data.
It is interesting to see that whether the proposed heterogeneous model will be supported by the
data. First of all, the estimated coefficients of the import protection equation should satisfy the
sign predictions of the theories of G-H and Chang (2005) respectively for the subset of perfectly
and monopolistically competitive sectors. These sign predictions correspond to the two theories’
predictions on the relationship between import protection and import penetration for organized
and unorganized sectors. If the estimated coefficients of the heterogeneous model have the correct
signs, and if the model is supported by the J-test against the homogeneous G-H model, three
implications arise. First, this suggests that the model of Chang (2005) is borne out by the data
for monopolistically competitive sectors, although the G-H model remains valid for the subset
of perfectly competitive sectors. Second, this also suggests that the relationship between import
protection and import penetration varies across sectors of different market structures and across
sectors with or without political organization. Third, we may hence regard the political parameter
estimates derived from the heterogeneous specification as being more representative of the economy
under study than suggested by previous studies based on the homogeneous G-H model with perfect
competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic elements of
G-H and Chang (2005) and integrate the two models. In Section 3, we present the empirical
model for the general specification allowing for heterogeneous market structures and explain the
estimation methodology. The general specification is then compared to the homogeneous perfect
competition specification based on non-nested hypothesis tests. The empirical results are given in
Section 3.5. Section 4 concludes. Technical notes regarding the estimation methodologies are given
in the appendices.
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2. THE PROTECTION-FOR-SALE MODEL WITH
HETEROGENEOUS MARKET STRUCTURE
In this section, we integrate the Protection-for-Sale models of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and
Chang (2005). This construct allows the market structure to be heterogeneous across sectors – either
perfectly or monopolistically competitive. Suppose that a country is populated by individuals with
identical preference, but with potentially different endowments. The preference is given by:
U = C0 +
n∑
i=1
Ui(Ci) (1)
where C0 denotes consumption of good 0, Ci denotes consumption of good i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and Ui
is an increasing concave function. Good 0 serves as numeraire, with a world (and domestic) price
equal to 1. Let Pi denote the domestic price of good i. The demand for good i implied by the
preference in (1) is denoted Di(Pi), where Di(·) is the inverse of U ′i (·). The indirect utility of an
individual with income E is given by V = E+
∑n
i=1 Si(Pi), where Si(Pi) = Ui(Di(Pi))−PiDi(Pi) is
the consumer surplus derived from good i. If sector i is monopolistically competitive, Ci represents
the aggregate consumption of differentiated goods in sector i, with the aggregation following the
Dixit-Stiglitz functional form (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977):
Ci = (
mi∑
k=1
c %ihi,k +
m∗i∑
k=1
c %ifi,k)
1
%i 0 < %i < 1 (2)
where chi,k (cfi,k) is the consumption of home (foreign) variety k of good i and mi (m
∗
i ) is the
number of varieties of good i produced at home (abroad). The corresponding aggregate price level
Pi for the differentiated goods in sector i is:
Pi = (
mi∑
k=1
p1−σihi,k +
m∗i∑
k=1
p1−σifi,k )
1
1−σi (3)
where phi,k (pfi,k) is the consumer price for home (foreign) variety k of good i, and σi =
1
1−%i > 1
is the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of good i.
Good 0 is taken to be a homogeneous good, produced one-to-one from labor, and traded freely
and costlessly, so that the wage is equal to one at home and abroad. Production of the other goods
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requires labor and a sector-specific input. The various specific inputs are available in inelastic supply
K¯i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If sector i is perfectly competitive, the production technology exhibits constant
returns to scale. If sector i is monopolistically competitive, each variety of the differentiated goods
is assumed to require a fixed amount of the sector-specific factor ki in order to produce at all; after
that, there is a constant unit labor requirement θi. Thus, the number of varieties produced at
home in sector i is mi = K¯i/ki. The technology abroad to produce the differentiated products is
assumed to be the same as that at home. Thus, the number of varieties produced abroad in the
same sector is m∗i = K¯
∗
i /ki, where K¯
∗
i is the amount of sector-specific factor i the foreign country
is endowed with.
Let the domestic import policy τi denote one plus the ad valorem import tariff rate and the
domestic export policy si represent one plus the ad valorem export subsidy rate for sector i. Let
τ∗i and s
∗
i represent the corresponding foreign import and export policy for sector i, defined in the
similar way.
Suppose sector i is perfectly competitive and the exogenous world price is P ∗i . Then, the
domestic price is Pi = τiP ∗i in an import-competing sector, and is Pi = siP
∗
i in an export sector.
The returns to specific factor i depend only on Pi and are denoted by Πi(Pi). It follows that the
supply function of good i is Yi(Pi) = Π
′
i(Pi).
Suppose sector i is monopolistically competitive instead. Assume that there are a large number
of varieties (home and foreign combined) available to the consumer in sector i. Given the preference
specified in (2), each variety’s producer faces an approximately constant elasticity of demand, σi.
Thus, with profit maximization, the producer of each variety charges the same price: phi,k = phi =
p ∗fi =
θiσi
σi−1 , where p
∗
fi is the producer price for each foreign variety of good i in the foreign market.
Since the producer price of the home variety of good i is the same as that of the foreign variety,
the difference in their consumer prices at the home market reflects trade interventions: pfi =
τi
s∗i
phi.
Given this, the aggregate price index for differentiated good i in (3) can be simplified as:
Pi = phi(mi +m
∗
i (
τi
s∗i
)1−σi)
1
1−σi . (4)
The utility function Ui in (1) for monopolistically competitive sectors is assumed to take the func-
tional form: Ui = Ei lnCi. This amounts to assuming that an individual allocates a fixed amount of
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expenditure Ei on good i. The rest of the world is assumed to share the same preference structure,
but with a possibly different allocation of expenditure on various goods, E∗i . Given this, we can
derive the demand for a representative home and foreign variety of good i as:
chi =
Ei
phi
1
mi +m∗i (
τi
s∗i
)1−σi
(5)
cfi =
Ei
pfi
( τis∗i )
1−σi
mi +m∗i (
τi
s∗i
)1−σi
.
Similarly, a foreign individual will consume a representative home and foreign variety of good i
according to:
c ∗hi =
E∗i
p ∗hi
( τ
∗
i
si
)1−σi
mi(
τ∗i
si
)1−σi +m∗i
(6)
c ∗fi =
E∗i
p ∗fi
1
mi(
τ∗i
si
)1−σi +m∗i
where p ∗hi =
τ∗i
si
p ∗fi is the consumer price of a representative home variety of good i in the foreign
market. Given the domestic and foreign demand for its product, a representative home producer of
differentiated good i will produce at the scale of (Nchi +N∗c ∗hi), where N (N
∗) is the total home
(foreign) population. Thus, the returns to the specific factor used in differentiated sector i are:
Πi(τi, si) = mi(phi − θi)(Nchi +N∗c ∗hi).
The net tariff revenue from sector i, expressed on a per capita basis, is given by:
Ri =(1− Imi )(Pi − P ∗i )[Ci −
1
N
Xi]
+Imi [m
∗
i (τi − 1)
phi
s∗i
cfi −
N∗
N
mi(1− 1
si
)phi c
∗
hi] (7)
where Xi = Yi(Pi) is the domestic aggregate output of good i in a perfectly competitive sector,
and Imi is an indicator variable, which equals one if sector i is monopolistically competitive and
zero otherwise. It is assumed that the government redistributes the revenue R =
∑n
i=1Ri evenly
to each individual.
Assume that each individual owns a unit of labor and at most one type of specific factor.
Summing indirect utilities over all individuals, and noting that aggregate income is the sum of
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labor income, returns to specific factors and tariff revenue, one obtains aggregate welfare:
W = N +
n∑
i=1
Πi +N
n∑
i=1
(Ri + Si). (8)
We now describe the political structure. Suppose that in some subset of sectors L ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·n},
the specific-factor owners are able to form a lobby. Let αi denote the fraction of population that
owns specific factor i. Summing indirect utilities over all individuals who belong to lobby i, we
obtain lobby i’s aggregate well-being:
Wi = αiN +Πi + αiN
n∑
l=1
(Rl + Sl). (9)
Lobbies compete noncooperatively for the government’s favor and propose contribution schedules,
Ci(τ, s), contingent on the trade-policy vector set by the government, (τ, s). Lobby i’s objective
is to maximize the net aggregate well-being given by Wi − Ci. Given the contribution schedules
offered by the lobbies, the government in turn selects a trade-policy vector (τ, s) to maximize its
politically-motivated objective function, which is a combination of welfare and contributions:
G =
∑
i∈L
Ci + aW (10)
where a ≥ 0 captures the weight of welfare in the government’s objective relative to campaign
contributions. As shown in G-H, if the contribution schedules offered by lobbies are truthful, the
government’s objective function in (10) is equivalent to:
G˜ =
∑
i∈L
Wi + aW. (11)
To find the equilibrium trade policy, one can rewrite G˜ as:
G˜ = (a+ αL)N +
n∑
i=1
(a+ Ii)Πi + (a+ αL)N
n∑
i=1
(Ri + Si). (12)
where αL ≡
∑
i∈L αi denotes the fraction of population that is represented by a lobby, and Ii is
an indicator variable that equals one if sector i is organized and zero otherwise. We focus on the
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endogenous import policy henceforth, and refer interested readers to Chang (2005) for details on
the endogenous export policy. Let ti ≡ τi − 1 denote the ad valorem import tariff rate. Taking the
first-order derivative with respect to (12) yields the following results:
PROPOSITION 1 (Endogenous Protection Structure) If the contribution schedules of the
lobbies are truthful, the import policy that will emerge in the political equilibrium for a perfectly
competitive sector satisfies
toi
1 + toi
=
Ii − αL
a+ αL
zoi
eoi
(13)
where zoi = X
o
i /M
o
i is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports, and e
o
i = −Moi ′P oi /Moi
is the elasticity of import demand.
On the other hand, for a monopolistically competitive sector, the import policy that will emerge
in the political equilibrium satisfies
toj
1 + toj
=
Ij + a
a+ αL
σj−1
σj
σj + 1z˜oj
(14)
where z˜oj = phjmjc
o
hj / p
o
fjm
∗
jc
o
fj is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output supplied to the domestic
market relative to imports, and σj is the constant elasticity of substitution between domestic output
and imports.
Several observations on Proposition 1 can be made. First, if the government is not politically
motivated but maximizes aggregate welfare (a → ∞), the endogenous trade policy reduces to the
welfare-maximizing trade policy, which is free trade for a perfectly competitive sector and a posi-
tive import tariff (σj−1)/σjσj+1/z˜oj for a monopolistically competitive sector. Second, in both perfectly and
monopolistically competitive sectors, the endogenous protection level is relatively higher than the
benchmark welfare-maximizing level for organized sectors and lower for unorganized sectors. In
particular, in perfectly competitive sectors, organized sectors receive positive import tariff protec-
tion while unorganized sectors face negative protection. In monopolistically competitive sectors,
however, both organized and unorganized sectors receive positive import tariff protection. Third,
in a perfectly competitive sector, a higher degree of import penetration (1/zi) corresponds to a
lower level of import protection if the sector is organized, but to a higher level of import protection
if the sector is unorganized. In a monopolistically competitive sector, however, a higher degree
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of import penetration (1/z˜i) always corresponds to a lower level of import protection, regardless
of whether or not the sector is organized. As a final remark, the political parameters (αL and
a) have comparable effects on the endogenous protection level under both market structures. As
more people are politically represented (a larger αL), the general protection level decreases, and
as the government becomes more concerned with aggregate welfare (a larger a), the endogenous
protection level approaches the benchmark welfare-maximizing level.
3. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
If heterogeneity in market structure is ignored and all sectors are taken to be perfectly competitive,
equation (13) as derived originally by Grossman and Helpman (1994) applies to all sectors. This
theoretical specification has been the basis of empirical studies by Goldberg and Maggi (1999),
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Eicher and Osang (2002). For example, Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) form the following structural equation from (13):
ti
1 + ti
ei =
Ii − αL
a+ αL
zi + ²p,i
= γpzi + δpIizi + ²p,i (15)
where γp = −αL/(a+αL) and δp = 1/(a+αL). We call this specification the homogeneous perfect
competition (PC) model. Theory (13) implies that the coefficients of the PC model should satisfy
the following signs: (i) −1 < γp < 0, (ii) δp > 0, (iii) γp + δp > 0, for the nontrivial case where
a > 0 and 1 > αL > 0.
On the other hand, if all sectors are taken to be monopolistically competitive, equation (14)
applies to all sectors. A structural equation based on (14) can be derived in parallel with (15) as:
ti
1 + ti
ei =
Ii + a
a+ αL
ei − 1
ei + 1z˜i
+ ²m,i
= γmwi + δmIiwi + ²m,i (16)
where γm = a/(a+αL), δm = 1/(a+αL), and wi = ei−1ei+ 1z˜i
. Note that we have used ei as a proxy for
σi in (16), as σi being the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of good i is also the
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elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties, which is approximately the elasticity
of import demand, ei. Theory (14) implies that the coefficients for monopolistically competitive
sectors should observe the following signs: (i) 1 > γm > 0, (ii) δm > 0, (iii) γm + δm > 1, similarly
for the nontrivial case where a > 0 and 1 > αL > 0.
In this paper, we propose a generalized specification of endogenous protection structure based
on Proposition 1, which accommodates both potential market structures:
ti
1 + ti
ei = (1− Imi ){γpzi + δpIizi + ²p,i}+ Imi {γmwi + δmIiwi + ²m,i}, (17)
subject to the constraints: −γp + γm = 1 and δp = δm. The constraints follow directly from
the definitions of γp, δp, γm and δm, and the fact that all sectors, despite their market structure,
share the same set of political parameters for an economy. We call this generalized specification
the heterogeneous market structure (HC) model. Proposition 1 suggests that the coefficients of
the HC model should display the following signs: (i) −1 < γp < 0, (ii) δp > 0, (iii) γp + δp > 0,
(iv) 1 > γm > 0, (v) δm > 0, (vi) γm + δm > 1. Given the constraints (−γp + γm = 1 and δp = δm)
imposed in the estimation, it follows that conditions (i)–(iii) are equivalent to conditions (iv)–(vi).
3.1 Data and Measurement
The data set for the PC model was kindly provided by Eicher and Osang (2002) and was a recon-
struction of the data set described in Goldberg and Maggi (1999). We construct two additional
variables, Imi and z˜i, which are required for the HC model. We discuss the measurement and en-
dogeneity issues associated with estimation of the PC and HC models below and refer the reader
to the above two sources for further explanations of the data set.
The sectors investigated are 106 United States manufacturing sectors at the 3-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) level. The coverage ratios for nontariff barriers (NTB) in year 1983,
instead of tariffs, are used to proxy for the noncooperative endogenous protection level predicted
by the above theories. This is in view of the fact that tariff levels in reality are set cooperatively
among nations in international trade negotiations. Since the coverage ratio can only take values
between 0 and 1, the protection variable ti is censored. We follow the benchmark mapping in
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) between the latent protection level and the nontariff barrier; that is,
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for coverage ratios less than 1, they reflect the equivalent tariff level. For latent protection levels
higher than 100 percent, they are mapped to the coverage ratio 1.
The trade elasticity estimates from Shiells et al. (1986) are used to measure the import demand
elasticity ei for perfectly competitive sectors, and the elasticity of substitution σi for monopolisti-
cally competitive sectors. For perfectly competitive sectors, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) brought
the import demand elasticity ei to the left hand side of the structural equation as in (15), be-
cause the variable is endogenous by theory (13) and yet no suitable instrumental variables could
be clearly identified. The elasticity of substitution σi for monopolistically competitive sectors is
not endogenous by theory (14). To facilitate estimation and comparison, however, we also phrase
the structural equation in (16) for monopolistically competitive sectors in a similar fashion such
that the left-hand side variable is also a composite of the protection measure and the elasticity
measure. The elasticity terms that remain on the right-hand side of the structural equation (16)
for monopolistically competitive sectors can be taken as exogenous by theory (14).
The inverse import-penetration ratio zi for perfectly competitive sectors in (15) is measured by
the ratio of the value of shipments over imports as in Goldberg and Maggi (1999). The alterna-
tive inverse import-penetration ratio z˜i for monopolistically competitive sectors in (16), however,
requires slight modifications. It is measured as the ratio of the value of shipments to the do-
mestic market over imports, that is, the value of shipments net of exports divided by imports.
Because both imports and domestic productions depend on the protection level, these two inverse
penetration ratios are endogenous. We follow Goldberg and Maggi (1999) in the selection of the ex-
planatory variables for the inverse penetration ratio, zi. These include physical capital, inventories,
engineers/scientists, white-collar worker, skilled labor, semiskilled labor, cropland, pasture, forest,
coal, petroleum, and minerals (which are the explanatory variables used for import penetration in
Trefler, 1993), as well as seller concentration, buyer concentration, seller number of firms, buyer
number of firms, scale, capital stock, unionization, geographic concentration, and tenure (which
are a subset of the explanatory variables used for import protection in the same source). This
collection of explanatory variables are also used for the composite inverse penetration ratio, wi.
The political-organization dummy Ii is exogenous in theory, but is empirically measured based
on sectoral political contributions. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) construct the dummy using the
threshold level of $1,000,000,000 for political action committee (PAC) contributions. A sector is
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considered politically organized for trade-policy purposes, if the sector’s PAC contribution is above
the threshold. Since the political contribution level Ci is endogenous in theory, constructing the
political-organization dummy based on Ci implies that Ii is potentially endogenous. Whether taking
Ii as endogenous or exogenous does not appear to make much difference in Goldberg and Maggi
(1999). There also arise significant methodological problems when Ii is taken as endogenous—we
explain the technical details in Appendix A. We will hence treat Ii as exogenous.
The market structure dummy Imi specifies which of the two protection regimes in (17) applies
to sector i, and hence is crucial to the estimation of the HC model. To construct the market
structure dummy Imi , we begin with the observation that firms in a monopolistically competitive
sector necessarily face a demand elasticity larger than one. To see this, note that for theory (14)
to hold for monopolistically competitive sectors, the elasticity of substitution must be greater than
one. Thus, sectors with trade elasticity measures less than or equal to one are necessarily classified
as perfectly competitive. As a second condition, we require that the degree of seller competition in
a monopolistically competitive sector be lower than a specified threshold. This criterion relies on
the hypothesis that the degree of seller competition in monopolistically competitive sectors should
be low enough such that individual firms maintain a reasonable degree of monopoly power. We
use one of the exogenous variables, the seller number of firms, which is the number of competing
companies in a sector divided by the sector’s total sales, to measure the degree of seller competition.
Let ‘scomp’ denote the degree of seller competition and κ the chosen threshold. Thus, the market
structure dummy is defined as follows: a sector is classified as monopolistically competitive, if the
elasticity measure is greater than one and if the sector faces a relatively low degree of competition
(Imi = 1, if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ κ). We consider an extensive range of cutoff threshold κ in the
estimation of the HC model and let the data endogenously choose the optimal cutoff threshold.
The search for the optimal classification of sectors based on the above criteria involves at most
n searches conceptually, where n is the sample size. Specifically, we begin by setting κ at the
highest observed value of ‘scomp’; this is equivalent to imposing no restriction on the degree of
competition but relies purely on the simplistic criterion of elasticity measure. We then go down
the list of observed values of ‘scomp’ in a descending order as potential cutoff thresholds κ and
estimate the HC model based on the resulting classification of sectors. We stop the search at the
point where the number of sectors classified as monopolistically competitive reaches a preset lower
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bound. This lower bound is set so that a tolerable degree of freedom is maintained for the subset
of monopolistically competitive sectors in the estimation of the HC model.
3.2 The Full Econometric Model
Let SF stand for ‘structural form’. Given the above discussion, the full econometric model for the
PC model we consider is, with c¯i = 12ei > 0,
y SF : yi = max{0,min(y∗i , c¯i)}
y∗ SF : y∗i =
t∗i
1 + t∗i
ei = γpzi + δpIizi + ²p,i
zi = ζ ′pZi + up,i
observed : yi, zi, Ii, Zi, ei, c¯i, i = 1, ..., n, iid across i.
where up,i and ²p,i are dependent, which makes zi endogenous in y SF. The latent variable t∗i
indicates the true level of protection, which is censored at zero and one when measured by the
NTB coverage ratio. It follows that the upper censoring point for y∗ SF is c¯i, which varies across i.
The vector Zi consists of one and the explanatory variables for the inverse penetration ratio zi.
The HC model, on the other hand, takes the following form:
y SF : yi = max{0,min(y∗i , c¯i)}
y∗ SF : y∗i =
t∗i
1 + t∗i
ei = (1− Imi ){γpzi + δpIizi + ²p,i}+ Imi {γmwi + δmIiwi + ²m,i}
zi = (1− Imi ){ζ ′ppZi + upp,i}+ Imi {ζ ′pmZi + upm,i}
wi = (1− Imi ){ζ ′mpZi + ump,i}+ Imi {ζ ′mmZi + umm,i}
observed : yi, zi, wi, Ii, Imi , Zi, ei, c¯i, i = 1, ..., n, iid across i
s.t. : −γp + γm = 1 and δp = δm.
where upp,i and ²p,i, as well as umm,i and ²m,i, are dependent, which makes zi and wi endogenous.
In the above specification, we allow the endogenous variables (y∗i , zi, and wi) to follow different
regimes depending on the market structure, with y∗ SF explicitly guided by Proposition 1. As
discussed earlier, the SF coefficients of the two protection regimes must be related in the HC model
by the constraints: −γp + γm = 1 and δp = δm.
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3.3 Estimation
In view of the iid assumption, the subscript i will be omitted often in the following. The goal is to
estimate the SF parameters γp and δp in the PC model, and γp, δp, γm, and δm in the HC model
subject to the constraints: −γp + γm = 1 and δp = δm. There are two econometric problems in
pursuing the goal. One is the censoring in the y SF and the other is the endogeneity of z and w.
The z- (and w-) equation regressor vector Z that includes unity is essentially an instrument vector
for z (and w), but due to the nonlinearity caused by the censoring, the usual instrumental variable
estimator (IVE) for linear models is not applicable. As explained in Appendix A, we explored four
methods. They differ in terms of whether the censored maximum likelihood estimator (CMLE) or
the censored least absolute deviation estimator (CLAD) is used to estimate the y SF, and whether
the minimum distance estimator (MDE) or the two-stage least square type estimator (2SLS) is
used to account for the endogeneity of the z- (and w-) equation. The system maximum likelihood
estimator might be yet another option. Given the relatively small sample size coupled with the
relatively large number of parameters, we are led to adopt the 2SLS-CMLE combination after a
preliminary data analysis, as it is less restrictive than the system MLE in terms of the requisite
assumptions, and is more numerically stable than the MDE/CLAD.
Let σa and ρa,b stand for, respectively, the standard error of variable a and the correlation
between variables a and b. For the PC model, substituting the z- equation into the y∗ SF, we get
the y∗ SF-2SLS for the PC model and the conditional variance of the error term:
y∗ SF-2SLS : y∗ = γpζ ′pZ + δpIζ
′
pZ + {(γp + δpI)up + ²p}, (18)
σ2vp ≡ V ({·}|Z, I) = (γp + δpI)2σ2up + 2(γp + δpI)ρup,²pσupσ²p + σ2²p . (19)
The error term in {·} is heteroscedastic depending on I, and consists of two errors. Let ζˆp and
σˆup denote the first-stage least square estimate (LSE) for ζp and σup in the z- equation. In the
second stage, the y SF-2SLS can be estimated applying the usual CMLE with ζp and σup replaced
by ζˆp and σˆup , and with an adjustment owing to the heteroscedasticity. Define f(Z, I; γp, δp, ζp) ≡
γpζ
′
pZ+δpIζ
′
pZ, which is the SF-2SLS regression function of the PC model in (18). The second-stage
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log-likelihood function for the y SF-2SLS of the PC model is
Lp =
∑
i
{ 1[yi = 0] lnΦ(−f(Z, I; γp, δp, ζˆp)
σvp,i
)
+1[0 < yi < c¯i] ln
φ((yi − f(Z, I; γp, δp, ζˆp))/σvp,i)
σvp,i
+1[yi = c¯i] lnΦ(
f(Z, I; γp, δp, ζˆp)− c¯i
σvp,i
) }, (20)
which is to be maximized over γp, δp, σ²p , and ρup,²p ; note that σvp,i is a function of Ii and the param-
eters, which are suppressed to simplify notations. Denote the resulting estimates (γ˙p, δ˙p, σ˙²p , ρ˙up,²p).
Analogous steps are taken for the HC model. Substituting the z- and w- equation into the
y∗ SF, we get the y∗ SF-2SLS for the HC model and the conditional variance of the error term:
y∗ SF-2SLS : y∗ = (1− Im)(γpζ ′ppZ + δpIζ ′ppZ) + Im(γmζ ′mmZ + δmIζ ′mmZ)
+{(1− Im)(γp + δpI)upp + Im(γm + δmI)umm + (1− Im)²p + Im²m}, (21)
σ2vh ≡ V ({·}|Z, I, Im) = (1− Im)[(γp + δpI)2σ2upp + 2(γp + δpI)ρupp,²pσuppσ²p + σ2²p ]
+Im[(γm + δmI)2σ2umm + 2(γm + δmI)ρumm,²mσummσ²m + σ
2
²m ]. (22)
The error term in {·} is heteroscedastic depending on I and Im, and consists of four errors. Define
g(Z, I, Im; γp, δp, γm, δm, ζpp, ζmm) ≡ (1−Im)(γpζ ′ppZ+δpIζ ′ppZ)+Im(γmζ ′mmZ+δmIζ ′mmZ), which
is the SF-2SLS regression function of the HC model in (21). Denote the first-stage LSE for ζpp, σupp ,
ζmm, and σumm in the z- and w- equations as ζˆpp, σˆupp , ζˆmm, and σˆumm . The resulting second-stage
log-likelihood function for the y SF-2SLS of the HC model is
Lh =
∑
i
{ 1[yi = 0] lnΦ(−g(Z, I, I
m; γp, δp, γm, δm, ζˆpp, ζˆmm)
σvh,i
)
+1[0 < yi < c¯i] ln
φ((yi − g(Z, I, Im; γp, δp, γm, δm, ζˆpp, ζˆmm))/σvh,i)
σvh,i
+1[yi = c¯i] lnΦ(
g(Z, I, Im; γp, δp, γm, δm, ζˆpp, ζˆmm)− c¯i
σvh,i
) }, (23)
which is to be maximized over γp, δp, σ²p , γm, δm, σ²m , ρupp,²p , and ρumm,²m , subject to the con-
straints: −γp+γm = 1 and δp = δm. Denote the resulting estimates (γ¨p, δ¨p, σ¨²p , γ¨m, δ¨m, σ¨²m , ρ¨upp,²p , ρ¨umm,²m).
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We explain in Appendix B the details of how to account for the effect of first-stage estimation errors
on the second-stage asymptotic variance.
3.4 Hypothesis Testing
To assess the two competing models, we apply the J-test in Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) for
non-nested hypotheses. Recall that f(Z, I; γp, δp, ζp) is the SF-2SLS regression function of the PC
model in (18). Similarly, recall that g(Z, I, Im; γp, δp, γm, δm, ζpp, ζmm) is the SF-2SLS regression
function of the HC model in (21). Then, the J-test for the PC model as the null hypothesis proceeds
as follows. First, create an artificially augmented regression function based on f :
f˜ ≡ f(Z, I; γp, δp, ζp) + µhgˆ,
where gˆ = g(Z, I, Im; γ¨p, δ¨p, γ¨m, δ¨m, ζˆpp, ζˆmm) is the fitted value based on the parameter estimates
from the HC model. Next, obtain the 2SLS-CMLE based on a modified likelihood function L˜p as
in (20) but with f(·) replaced by the augmented regression function f˜ . Test for µh = 0. If µh = 0
is rejected, the PC model is rejected to the direction of the HC model.
The J-test for the HC model as the null hypothesis can be done analogously. Form an artificially
augmented regression function based on g:
g˜ ≡ g(Z, I, Im; γp, δp, γm, δm, ζpp, ζmm) + µpfˆ ,
where fˆ = f(Z, I; γ˙p, δ˙p, ζˆp) is the fitted value based on the parameter estimates from the PC
model. Obtain the 2SLS-CMLE based on a modified likelihood function L˜h as in (23) but with g(·)
replaced by the augmented regression function g˜. Test for µp = 0. If µp = 0 is rejected, the HC
model is rejected to the direction of the PC model.
3.5 Result
In Table 1, we present the search process for the optimal classification of sectors for the HC model.
As introduced in Section 3.1, the market structure dummy is defined as follows: a sector is classified
as monopolistically competitive, if the elasticity measure is greater than one and if the sector faces
a relatively low degree of seller competition (Imi = 1, if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ κ). The first column
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of Table 1 lists the cutoff thresholds κ¯ that we explore and the second column their corresponding
rankings among all observed values of seller competition. We begin by setting κ at the highest
observed value of seller competition (κ¯ = 1.3865). This is equivalent to imposing no constraint
on seller competition, and sectors are classified based on the magnitude of elasticity alone. In
this case, there are 59 sectors (out of 106 sectors) with elasticity larger than one and classified as
monopolistically competitive. The HC model is estimated based on the resulting classification of
sectors, and the political parameter estimates and the likelihood value are reported in the fourth
column. We then lower the cutoff threshold to the next largest observed value of seller competition
and re-estimate the HC model. This is repeated for the rest of observed values of seller competition
in a descending order. The number of sectors classified as monopolistically competitive weakly
decreases as the cutoff threshold lowers. We stop the search at the point when only 35 sectors are
classified as monopolistically competitive. This corresponds to κ¯ = 0.1873. The lower bound on the
number of classified monopolistically competitive sectors is chosen based on the consideration that
there are 22 parameters to be estimated for each market structure in the reduced form equations
for z and w and that some reasonable degree of freedom has to be maintained. In addition, as
the criteria become too stringent for a sector to be classified as monopolistically competitive, few
monopolistically competitive sectors are left under the HC model. In this case, the HC model
approaches the PC model, and it will not be such an informative exercise to compare the two.
Table 1 indicates that as the cutoff threshold lowers, the likelihood of the HC model first rises
(albeit not strictly monotonically) and then falls. The maximum likelihood of the HC model is
found in the interior of the search domain at κ¯ = 0.2513. This corresponds to a specification of the
market structure dummy according to: Imi = 1, if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ 0.2513.
In Table 2, we present the details of the estimation results for the case where the HC model
is estimated based on the optimal specification of the market structure dummy. The PC model is
independent of the market structure dummy and is estimated for all sectors. The summary statistics
show that all sectors on average face an import demand elasticity of 2.4443 and a nontariff barrier
coverage ratio of 0.1350. Among all sectors, less than half (0.4245) are politically organized for
trade policy purposes. Based on the PC model, the resulting parameter estimates of γp and δp are
of correct signs in accordance with theory (13) and are significant. The estimate of γp + δp is also
of correct sign, but is not significant. According to these estimates, the weight of welfare in the
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government’s objective (β ≡ a1+a) is 0.9890, while the fraction of population represented by a lobby
(αL) is 0.7981. The results are broadly consistent with those of Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
For the HC model, based on the optimal specification of the market structure dummy: Imi = 1,
if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ 0.2513, there are 41 monopolistically competitive sectors and 65 perfectly
competitive sectors. Monopolistically competitive sectors show a theoretically-desired lower degree
of seller competition (0.1040) than perfectly competitive sectors (0.3233). The summary statistics
also indicate that on average, monopolistically competitive sectors face higher import demand
elasticity, are more likely to be politically organized, and receive higher levels of import protection.
Based on the HC model, the parameter estimates of γp, δp, γm, and δm are of correct signs consistent
with Proposition 1. The estimate of γp + δp (and correspondingly that of γm + δm) is greater than
zero (greater than one) as predicted by Proposition 1. However, except for γm, the estimates are not
statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that the degree of freedom is greatly reduced
in the HC model with the sample broken into two regimes. Based on the above estimates, the
weight of welfare in the government’s objective (β ≡ a1+a) is 0.9989 and the fraction of population
politically represented (αL) is 0.5856.
The higher weight of welfare in the government’s objective implied by the HC model, relative to
the PC model, may be explained by the fact that the welfare-maximizing tariff for a monopolistically
competitive sector is positive. Thus, even if a government were not politically motivated (with
β = 1), a monopolistically competitive sector would still receive a positive level of protection. Thus,
for a given level of observed protection, it would imply a higher weight of political contribution
(and a lower weight of welfare) placed by the government if the sector is classified as perfectly
competitive than if it is classified as monopolistically competitive.
Given that both models’ parameter estimates have correct signs, we evaluate their statistical
goodness of fit based on the J-test discussed in Section 3.4. The results in Table 2 show that the
PC model as the null is rejected at 1% significance level while the HC model with the optimal
specification of the market structure dummy is accepted. Based on the J-test results, we conclude
that the HC model given the optimal classification of sectors provides a statistically-significant
better fit to the data than the PC model.
One might question that how robust the result is if the market structure dummy is not optimally
specified for the HC model. As indicated in the last column of Table 1, the PC model is consistently
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rejected regardless of how the market structure dummy is specified for the HC model. On the other
hand, the HC model is accepted against the PC model provided that the specification of the market
structure dummy is not too far off from the optimal specification. The HC model is accepted if the
market structure dummy is specified as: Imi = 1, if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ κ¯, for 0.2513 ≤ κ¯ ≤ 0.3233.
Overall, the above results cast doubt on the PC model as a complete model and suggest a direction
of improvement toward the HC model with a properly specified market structure dummy.
The estimates of the HC model in Table 2 suggest a higher weight of welfare in the government’s
objective (β = 0.9989) than indicated by previous studies based on G-H (0.986 in Goldberg and
Maggi, 1999; 0.96 in Eicher and Osang, 2002). This is consistent with our earlier discussion that
misspecifying a monopolistically competitive sector as perfectly competitive tends to assign the
supposedly welfare-driven component of protection as politically motivated, and to bias upward
(downward) the estimate of the government’s weight on political contribution (aggregate welfare).
The estimates of the degree of political representation (αL) vary a lot in the literature, ranging
from 0.98 in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), 0.88 in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), to 0.26 in
Eicher and Osang (2002). Our estimate of αL at 0.5856 suggests an intermediate degree of political
representation in the trade policy arena.
4. CONCLUSION
Previous cross-sectional empirical studies based on Grossman and Helpman (1994) have often
adopted homogeneous (perfect competition) market structure, where all sectors are taken to be
perfectly competitive and share the same protection structure according to G-H. In this paper, we
propose a general empirical specification that accommodates both monopolistically and perfectly
competitive sectors, with the protection structure for monopolistically competitive sectors guided
by the recent theory of Chang (2005). The results of this paper cast doubt on the protection-
for-sale model with homogeneous perfect-competition market structure and suggest a direction of
improvement toward the proposed protection-for-sale model with heterogeneous market structure.
This empirical finding implies that the Chang (2005) model is borne out by the data for monop-
olistically competitive sectors; meanwhile, the predictions of G-H remain valid for the subset of
perfectly competitive sectors. The finding also suggests that the response of endogenous protection
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to import penetration is heterogeneous: it depends on the market structure of a sector (whether the
sector is perfectly or monopolistically competitive) and its state of political organization (whether
or not the sector is politically organized). When all of these aspects of heterogeneity are taken into
account, the resulting estimates imply that the government’s weight on aggregate welfare is higher
than suggested by previous literature (with similar estimation framework) and the government is
close to being a welfare maximizer. On the other hand, the degree of political representation falls in
the intermediate range; around half of the population is politically represented in the trade policy
arena.
A caveat is warranted. The sample studied here, as well as in previous G-H-type empirical work,
has focused mainly on manufacturing sectors where the general protection level is low, and has ex-
cluded the agriculture sector where heavy protection persists. With the agriculture sector included,
the conclusions are likely to change toward finding a more special-interest driven government.
APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY FOR TOBIT
MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS
In this appendix, we describe the estimators we explored in our preliminary analysis. The notations
here differ somewhat from those in the main text for the sake of simplification. This appendix will
also serve as a review on the possible estimation methods employed in previous G-H-type empirical
studies. Define an indicator function 1[A] = 1 if A holds and 0 otherwise. Let SF and RF stand
for ‘structural form’ and ‘reduced form’, respectively. Suppose the equations under consideration
are, with c > 0,
y SF : yi = max{0,min(y∗i , c)}, where y∗ SF is y∗i = βwwi + βdwdiwi + ui,
wi = z′iηw + vwi, where vwi and ui are dependent
di = 1[d∗i > 0], where d
∗
i = z
′
iηd + vdi, vdi and ui are dependent, (Model 1)
observed : di, zi, wi, yi, i = 1, ..., N , iid across i.
The goal is to estimate the SF parameters βw and βdw. The upper censoring point c can be allowed
to vary across i so long as ci is observed and independent of yi. A simpler version of Model 1 is
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obtained if d is exogenous:
same as Model 1 but d is exogenous under independence between vd and u. (Model 2)
In this case, the slope of w in y∗ = (βw+βdwd)w+u shifts exogenously depending on d. Substituting
the w equation into the y∗ SF, we get the y∗ RF:
y∗ RF : y∗ = z′(βwηw) + dz′(βdwηw) + {(βw + βdwd)vw + u}
where the error term in {·} is heteroscedastic depending on d and consists of two errors.
Write the y∗ RF simply as y∗i = x
′
iα + εi, such that yi = max{0,min(x′iα + εi, c)}, where xi
is the exogenous regressor vector, α is the parameter vector, and εi is the error term. Under the
independence of ε from x and the normality ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε), the Censored MLE (CMLE) is obtained
with the log-likelihood function
∑
i
{1[yi = 0] lnΦ(−x
′
iα
σε
) + 1[0 < yi < c] ln{φ((yi − x
′
iα)/σε)
σε
}+ 1[yi = c] lnΦ(x
′
iα− c
σε
)}
which is maximized with respect to (wrt) α and σε. CMLE converges reasonably well.
Denoting the conditional median of ε|x asMed(ε|x), a semiparametric estimator requiring only
Med(ε|x) = 0 while allowing an unknown form of heteroskedasticity is the Censored Least Absolute
Deviation estimator (CLAD) of Powell (1984). For the double censoring case, CLAD minimizes
wrt α ∑
i
|yi −max{0,min(x′iα, c)}|.
The requisite assumption for CLAD is weaker than that for CMLE. Also, no ‘nuisance parameter’
such as σε appears for CLAD.
Eicher and Osang (2002) apply Minimum Distance Estimator (MDE) as explained in Lee
(1996a). But MDE requires a somewhat different model from above: instead of the d equation,
suppose
dw equation : diwi = z′iηdw + vdwi.
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Then, substituting the above w equation and this dw equation into the above y∗ SF yields
y∗ RF-MDE : y∗i = βw(z
′
iηw + vwi) + βdw(z
′
iηdw + vdwi) + ui ≡ z′iηy + vy, where
vy ≡ βwvwi + βdwvdwi + ui and
MDE Restriction : ηy = βwηw + βdwηdw.
This y∗ RF in turn leads to
y RF-MDE : yi = max{0,min(z′iηy + vy, c)}.
The MDE proceeds in two steps. First, estimate ηy for the y RF-MDE with a censored model
estimator, and ηw and ηdw with Least Squares Estimator (LSE); denote the estimators as hy, hw,
and hdw, respectively. Second, do the LSE of hy on hw and hdw to estimate the two scalars βw and
βdw, which works owing to the MDE Restriction above.
The MDE procedure works well in practice. But the shortcoming is the linear model assumption
for dw, which is not tenable in principle because dw is not a continuously distributed random
variable due to P (d = 0) = P (dw = 0) > 0. Recognizing this problem, one may apply a little
different MDE: use a censored model
diwi = max(0, z′iηdw + vdwi)
and estimate this with a CMLE. This should provide a better approximation for dw, but leads
to a new problem that the MDE restriction—and consequently y RF-MDE—holds only on d = 1.
Estimating the y RF-MDE using only the subsample d = 1 causes the usual sample selection
problem if d is endogenous. If d is exogenous, then the MDE procedure works so long as the
estimation of the y RF-MDE is done with the d = 1 subsample. That is, the MDE procedure is
tenable under Model 2.
Lee (1996b) proposes a Two-Stage-LSE (2SLS) type approach for limited dependent variable
models with endogenous regressors. The idea is to replace each endogenous regressor with its
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conditional mean given the instruments. For this, rewrite the y∗ SF as
y∗ SF-2SLS-1 : y∗i = βwE(w|zi) + βdwE(dw|zi)
+ui + βw{wi − E(w|zi)}+ βdw{diwi − E(dw|zi)}
where the last three terms constitute the new (composite) error term. The conditional means
E(w|z) and E(dw|z) can be estimated nonparametrically. In practice, the LSE for wi = z′iηw + vwi
and diwi = z′iηdw+vdwi will do. The latter (practical) approach has the same problem as the above
MDE, because the linear model for the product dw is not tenable in principle.
The 2SLS approach can be similarly applied to Model 2. Rewrite the y∗ SF as
y∗ SF-2SLS-2 : y∗i = βwE(w|zi) + βdwdiE(w|zi)
+ui + βw{wi − E(w|zi)}+ βdwdi{wi −E(w|zi)}
where the last three terms constitute the new (composite) error term. The conditional mean E(w|z)
can be estimated using the LSE for wi = z′iηw+vwi. Hence the problem mentioned above wrt y
∗ RF-
MDE and y∗ SF-2SLS-1 does not arise in this case. The y∗ SF-2SLS leads straightforwardly to the
y SF-2SLS, to which CMLE or CLAD can be applied.
Considering our discussions so far, we can think of at least four methods to estimate βd and
βdw:
CMLE CLAD
MDE y RF estimated, normality y RF estimated, zero median
2SLS y SF-2SLS estimated, normality y SF-2SLS estimated, zero median
Other than the approaches listed in the above table, one may also attempt to apply the system
MLE to Model 1 under (u, vw, vd) ∼ N(0,Ω), where the covariance matrix Ω has SD(u), SD(vw),
COR(u, vw), COR(u, vd), and COR(vw, vd); SD(vd) is not identified. But this MLE has two
problems. First, with d endogenous, it seems difficult to obtain the likelihood function. Second,
even if the likelihood function is found, estimating the correlation coefficients (and the standard
deviations) is notoriously difficult in multivariate MLE’s. In practice, often some correlations are
assumed to be zero (e.g., COR(vw, vd) = 0), or an equi-correlation assumption is imposed (e.g.,
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COR(u, vw) = COR(u, vd)). It is not clear how Goldberg and Maggi (1999) proceeded, as the
likelihood function and the estimate for Ω for their MLE were not shown. Alternatively, if Model 2
is adopted, the likelihood function becomes straightforward, with the size of the covariance matrix
greatly reduced. Overall, in view of the econometrics problems discussed above in implementing
Model 1, we choose to adopt Model 2 in the main text.
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE
STANDARD ERRORS OF THE 2SLS-CMLE
Let α be the first stage parameter of dimension k1 × 1 and aN be the LSE. Let β be the likelihood
parameter of dimension k2× 1 for the second stage, and bN be the MLE. Denote the second stage
score function as s(zi, α, β); omit zi for simplification. Define
∇αs(α, β)
k2×k1
≡ ∂s(α, β)
∂α′
and ∇βs(α, β)
k2×k2
≡ ∂s(α, β)
∂β′
.
By the definition of bN , it holds that, using Taylor’s expansion,
0 =
1√
N
∑
i
s(aN , bN )
=⇒ 0 ' 1√
N
∑
i
s(aN , β) + { 1
N
∑
i
∇βs(α, β)}
√
N(bN − β)
=⇒
√
N(bN − β) = −{ 1
N
∑
i
∇βs(α, β)}−1 1√
N
∑
i
s(aN , β)
=⇒
√
N(bN − β) = −{ 1
N
∑
i
s(α, β)s(α, β)′}−1 1√
N
∑
i
s(aN , β).
To account for the first-stage error aN − α, define
HN ≡ 1
N
∑
i
∇βs(α, β) = 1
N
∑
i
s(α, β)s(α, β)′ and LN ≡ 1
N
∑
i
∇αs(α, β).
Apply Taylor’s expansion to s(aN , β) in the above expression for
√
N(bN − β) to get
√
N(bN − β) ' −H−1N · {
1√
N
∑
i
s(α, β) + LN
√
N(aN − α)}.
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With ri denoting the first-stage LSE residual with Zi as the regressor, observe
√
N(aN − α) = 1√
N
∑
i
(
1
N
∑
i
ZiZ
′
i)
−1Ziri
≡ 1√
N
∑
i
ηi, where ηi ≡ ( 1
N
∑
i
ZiZ
′
i)
−1Ziri.
Hence
√
N(bN − β) ' −H−1N {
1√
N
∑
i
s(α, β) + LN
1√
N
∑
i
ηi}
= −H−1N
1√
N
∑
i
{s(α, β) + LNηi}
= −H−1N
1√
N
∑
i
qi, where qi ≡ s(α, β) + LNηi.
Therefore, with Ã denoting convergence in law,
√
N(bN − β)Ã N(0,H−1E(qq′)H−1) where H ≡ E{s(α, β)s(α, β)′}.
Consistent estimators for H and E(qq′) are
HˆN ≡ 1
N
∑
i
s(aN , bN )s(aN , bN )′,
QN ≡ 1
N
∑
i
{s(aN , bN ) + LˆNηi}{s(aN , bN ) + LˆNηi}′ where LˆN ≡ 1
N
∑
i
∇αs(aN , bN ).
In practice, s can be obtained by numerical derivatives, and ∇αs can be obtained using numerical
derivatives once more. If the first-stage LSE involves two equations, each with regressor Zji, residual
rji, ηji, and the parameter αj , j = 1, 2, then set α ≡ (α′1, α′2)′, aN ≡ (a′1N , a′2N )′, ηi ≡ (η′1i, η′2i)′ and
proceed as above.
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Table 1: The HC model estimates conditional on the classification of sectors
classification of sectors HC model estimates J-test
cutoff
value of
scomp (κ¯)
cutoff
ranking
of scomp
no. of MC
sectors
a αL Lh PC HC
1.3865 106 59 849.0493 (740.7607) 0.4545 (0.4453) -78.3968 R∗∗ R∗∗
1.3222 105 59 849.0493 (740.7607) 0.4545 (0.4453) -78.3968 R∗∗ R∗∗
1.2246 104 59 849.0493 (740.7607) 0.4545 (0.4453) -78.3968 R∗∗ R∗∗
1.2014 103 58 830.3585 (669.8679) 0.5210 (0.4391) -77.9522 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.9717 102 57 810.7296 (616.9224) 0.5327 (0.4179) -77.3769 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.9716 101 56 857.9891 (657.7732) 0.4926 (0.4155) -75.1774 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.6550 100 56 857.9891 (657.7732) 0.4926 (0.4155) -75.1774 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.6397 99 55 858.8432 (659.0478) 0.4914 (0.4155) -74.9309 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.6289 98 54 851.6470 (673.4271) 0.4464 (0.4140) -74.7138 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.5953 97 53 909.7454 (760.2341) 0.4318 (0.4343) -72.7223 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.5896 96 52 874.5466 (695.5136) 0.4379 (0.4181) -72.4156 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.5628 95 51 661.9317 (433.5991) 0.4787 (0.3519) -73.5389 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.5429 94 51 661.9317 (433.5991) 0.4787 (0.3519) -73.5389 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.4926 93 50 696.3284 (472.3664) 0.4718 (0.3636) -71.3375 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.4868 92 50 696.3284 (472.3664) 0.4718 (0.3636) -71.3375 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.4619 91 50 696.3284 (472.3664) 0.4718 (0.3636) -71.3375 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.4380 90 49 727.0918 (510.5308) 0.4718 (0.3789) -69.7894 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.4262 89 48 763.1615 (555.1879) 0.4624 (0.3892) -67.4248 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.4220 88 47 807.7733 (629.8685) 0.4926 (0.4354) -65.1257 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.3668 87 47 807.7733 (629.8685) 0.4926 (0.4354) -65.1257 R∗∗ R∗∗
0.3549 86 46 802.1698 (630.5880) 0.4672 (0.4306) -63.3556 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.3507 85 46 802.1698 (630.5880) 0.4672 (0.4306) -63.3556 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.3233 84 45 825.5517 (670.0232) 0.5107 (0.4711) -61.0028 R∗∗∗ A
0.3229 83 44 869.5347 (594.5170) 0.5537 (0.4182) -59.7069 R∗∗∗ A
0.3115 82 43 903.2278 (637.4129) 0.5463 (0.4303) -57.5475 R∗∗ A
0.2973 81 43 903.2278 (637.4129) 0.5463 (0.4303) -57.5475 R∗∗ A
0.2920 80 43 903.2278 (637.4129) 0.5463 (0.4303) -57.5475 R∗∗ A
0.2623 79 42 920.0701 (664.4405) 0.5341 (0.4374) -57.1308 R∗∗∗ A
0.2594 78 42 920.0701 (664.4405) 0.5341 (0.4374) -57.1308 R∗∗∗ A
0.2528 77 42 920.0701 (664.4405) 0.5341 (0.4374) -57.1308 R∗∗∗ A
0.2513 76 41 888.3396 (593.6911) 0.5856 (0.4136) -55.9352 R∗∗∗ A
0.2382 75 40 494.6710 (237.9385) 0.5536 (0.2767) -67.8295 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2353 74 39 443.6104 (184.3986) 0.6248 (0.2547) -66.7684 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2335 73 39 443.6104 (184.3986) 0.6248 (0.2547) -66.7684 R∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2332 72 38 435.6234 (172.8254) 0.6088 (0.2406) -64.9324 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2125 71 38 435.6234 (172.8254) 0.6088 (0.2406) -64.9324 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2105 70 38 435.6234 (172.8254) 0.6088 (0.2406) -64.9324 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2029 69 38 435.6234 (172.8254) 0.6088 (0.2406) -64.9324 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2011 68 37 432.2619 (172.2964) 0.6056 (0.2401) -63.8470 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.2010 67 36 427.5867 (169.9796) 0.6374 (0.2434) -62.8964 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.1885 66 36 427.5867 (169.9796) 0.6374 (0.2434) -62.8964 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
0.1873 65 35 416.3748 (165.2915) 0.6419 (0.2449) -62.4645 R∗∗∗ R∗∗∗
Note:
1. The variable ‘seller competition (scomp)’ is the number of seller firms in an industry divided by total
industry sales. A sector is classified as monopolistically competitive (MC) if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ κ¯.
2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
3. R∗ indicates rejection at the 10% significance level, R∗∗ indicates rejection at the 5% significance level,
and R∗∗∗ indicates rejection at the 1% significance level. ‘A’ indicates acceptance at least at the 10%
significance level.
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Table 2: classification of sectors based on elasticity and seller competition
(Imi = 1, if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ 0.2513)
PC HC
γp -0.0088∗∗∗ (0.0032) -0.0007 (0.0004)
δp 0.0110∗ (0.0059) 0.0011 (0.0008)
σ²p 0.6693 (0.1037) 0.1193 (0.0148)
ρup,²p(ρupp,²p) -0.9149 (0.6486) -1
γm 0.9993∗∗∗ (0.0004)
δm 0.0011 (0.0008)
σ²m 1.3661 (0.0572)
ρumm,²m -1
γp + δp 0.0022 (0.0045) 0.0005 (0.0007)
γm + δm − 1 0.0005 (0.0007)
a 90.1326∗ (48.1782) 888.3396 (593.6911)
αL 0.7981∗∗ (0.3271) 0.5856 (0.4136)
Lp v.s. Lh -99.0480 -55.9352
J test:
µh v.s. µp 0.7454∗∗∗ (0.2797) 0.4192 (0.5138)
L˜p v.s. L˜h -92.8236 -53.4008
Summary Statistics: no. of sectors e¯ ¯scomp I¯ t¯
Imi = 1 41 4.5843 0.1040 0.5122 0.1561
Imi = 0 65 1.0944 0.3233 0.3692 0.1217
Total 106 2.4443 0.2385 0.4245 0.1350
Note:
1. Imi = 1, if ei > 1 and scompi ≤ 0.2513, and Imi = 0 otherwise. The variable
‘seller competition (scomp)’ is the number of seller firms in an industry divided
by total industry sales.
2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
3. A ∗ sign indicates significance at 10% level, a ∗∗ sign indicates significance at
5% level, and a ∗∗∗ sign indicates significance at 1% level.
4. For parameters, σ²p and σ²m , which are not tested against zero, we do not
attach the ∗ sign.
5. The estimates of ρupp,²p and ρumm,²m in the HC model reach the lower bound
−1. Note that ρ = −1 does not make the likelihood function of the HC model
degenerate as it would do in a bivariate normal density function.
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